Filtern
Dokumenttyp
- Wissenschaftlicher Artikel (14) (entfernen)
Sprache
- Englisch (14) (entfernen)
Schlagworte
- MITRE (1)
- OSINT (1)
- advanced persistent threats (1)
- blockchain (1)
- bloxberg (1)
- cyber kill chain (1)
- dlt (1)
- ethereum (1)
- measurement study (1)
- open science (1)
The set of transactions that occurs on the public ledger of an Ethereum network in a specific time frame can be represented as a directed graph, with vertices representing addresses and an edge indicating the interaction between two addresses.
While there exists preliminary research on analyzing an Ethereum network by the means of graph analysis, most existing work is focused on either the public Ethereum Mainnet or on analyzing the different semantic transaction layers using static graph analysis in order to carve out the different network properties (such as interconnectivity, degrees of centrality, etc.) needed to characterize a blockchain network. By analyzing the consortium-run bloxberg Proof-of-Authority (PoA) Ethereum network, we show that we can identify suspicious and potentially malicious behaviour of network participants by employing statistical graph analysis. We thereby show that it is possible to identify the potentially malicious
exploitation of an unmetered and weakly secured blockchain network resource. In addition, we show that Temporal Network Analysis is a promising technique to identify the occurrence of anomalies in a PoA Ethereum network.
Third-party tracking is a common and broadly used technique on the Web. Different defense mechanisms have emerged to counter these practices (e.g. browser vendors that ban all third-party cookies). However, these countermeasures only target third-party trackers and ignore the first party because the narrative is that such monitoring is mostly used to improve the utilized service (e.g. analytical services). In this paper, we present a large-scale measurement study that analyzes tracking performed by the first party but utilized by a third party to circumvent standard tracking preventing techniques. We visit the top 15,000 websites to analyze first-party cookies used to track users and a technique called “DNS CNAME cloaking”, which can be used by a third party to place first-party cookies. Using this data, we show that 76% of sites effectively utilize such tracking techniques. In a long-running analysis, we show that the usage of such cookies increased by more than 50% over 2021.